In this paper, we investigate the problem of secure communication with covert requirement in untrusted relaying networks. Our considered system model contains one source, one destination, one untrusted relay, and one Willie. The untrusted relay tries to extract the information signal, while the goal of Willie is to detect the presence of the information signal transmitted by the source, in the current time slot. To overcome these two attacks, it is assumed that the destination and the source inject jamming signal to the network in phase I and phase II, respectively. Accordingly, the communication in our proposed system model is accomplished in two phases. In the first phase, when the source transmits its data to the untrusted relay, the destination broadcasts its jamming signal. In the second phase, when the relay retransmits the received signal, the source transmits a jamming signal with one of its antennas. For this system model, we suggest a novel power allocation strategy to maximize the instantaneous secrecy rate subject to satisfying the covert requirements in both of the phases. Since the proposed optimization problem is non-convex, the Successive Convex Approximation (SCA) method is used to change it to a convex optimization problem. Numerical curves are presented to reveal the impact of the untrusted relay's location an number of source antennas on the secrecy performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security against eavesdropping play vital role in wireless communication networks and hence, significant attentions should be payed to these areas. To tackle the eavesdropping attack, physical layer security (PLS) has been widely investigated in different system models since Wyners introduced the wiretap channel concept [1] . Wyner demonstrates when the eavesdropper's channel is a degraded version of the legitimate users channel, a positive secrecy rate is achievable, [2] . Toward this end, several solutions have been presented to improve the PLS: transmit beamforming [3] , [4] , cooperative techniques [5] , [6] , and artificial noise aided transmission [7] .
Relaying is an emerging effective solution to enhance the energy efficiency, increasing coverage, and improving throughput in wireless communications. However, an untrusted relay may intentionally overhear the information signal when relaying, i.e., the untrusted relay is a collaborator in service level while it may be an eavesdropper in data level. This scenario occurs in large-scale wireless systems such as Adhoc networks and Internet-of-things (IoT) applications, where secret messages are often re-forwarded by intermediate nodes.
To achieve a positive secrecy rate in untrusted relaying networks, the destination-based cooperative jamming (DBCJ) scheme was first introduced in [8] . In DBCJ the destination itself contributes to degrade the received signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) at the helper node who may act as an eavesdropper. transmits its confidential message to a single antenna destination in presence of a passive eavesdropper, i.e., an untrusted relay. In our considered network, while the untrusted relay cannot decode the source message, the external eavesdropper is avoided to be aware from the communication in order to provide a strong security in our wireless network. The proposed secure transmission scheme using the untrusted relay is accomplished in two phases. In the first phase, the source transmits data with beamforming technique to the untrusted relay, and simultaneously, destination transmits artificial noise, to confuse the curios relay. In the second phase, the relay forwards the received signal of the previous phase, while concurrently the source transmits artificial noise. For this system model, we take into account the power allocation problem in each phase so that the untrusted relay is not able to extract the information signal and Willie cannot decide about the communication between legitimate nodes of the network. Toward this end, the power allocation between the source and destination is formulated that maximizes the instantaneous secrecy rate of untrusted relaying while concurrently hiding the communication against the passive eavesdropping attack. Since the optimization problem is non-convex, the Successive Convex Approximation (SCA) method is exploited to convert it to a convex optimization problem. Our simulation results show when the relay is near to source the ergodic secrecy rate is lower than when relay is far from the source.
This work is organized as follows. In Section II, system and signal model are presented. Section III provides the detailed problem formulation. Numerical examples are presented in Section IV. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section V.
II. SYSTEM AND SIGNAL MODEL
As mentioned, the system model under investigation is a one-way relay network consisting of one multiple antenna source with N s antennas, a single antenna destination, a single antenna untrusted amplify-and forward (AF) relay, and a single antenna Willie. The untrusted relay attempts to decode the information signal, while the goal of Willie is to detect whether the source has sent a signal to destination or not, in the current time slot. Hence, to increase the error probability of signal detection, the source transmits data in some time slots not during all of the time slots. In addition, it is assumed that all the nodes work under half-duplex mode. Our proposed network operates at two phases. In the first phase, the source forwards data with beamforming technique toward the untrusted relay, and the destination injects artificial noise to decrease the signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio (SINR) of the relay and to deceive Willie. In the second phase, the relay normalizes the received signal and broadcasts it. During this phase, the source emits jamming signal for deceiving Willie. This communication is performed through a discrete-time channel with T time slots at which each time slot consists of n symbols. The source's data signal and the jamming signal of the source and the destination in each time slot can be expressed as x , and x d = x 1 d , x 2 d , . . . , x n d , respectively.
The complex Gaussian channel between the source and untrusted relay, source and Willie, untrusted relay and Willie, untrusted relay and destination, and destination and Willie are denoted by h sr ∼ CN (0 Ns×1 , µ sr I Ns×1 ), h sw ∼ CN (0 Ns×1 , µ sw I Ns×1 ), h rw ∼ CN (0, µ rw ) , h rd ∼ CN (0, µ rd ), and h dw ∼ CN (0, µ dw ), respectively, where I is the identity matrix, 0 is the zero matrix, and µ sr , µ sw , µ rw , µ rd , µ dw are variances of each link per branch. The received th signal at the each time slot, at untrusted relay in the first phase is given by
where x
(1) s and x d are the transmitted th symbols by source and destination, respectively and n r ∼ CN 0, σ 2 is additive white noise with Gaussian distribution (AWGN) at the untrusted relay. Note that, the codebook for x d is unknown at both relay and Willie while the codebook for x (1) s is known at relay and unknown at Willie. P is the overall transmit power at each node and ρ is transmit power allocation factor in the first phase. Since Willie's CSI is not available, the weight vector w = hsr hsr is considered, which represents the maximum ratio transmission (MRT) beamformer at the source. Moreover, notation Ψ 0 states that the source does not transmit data to the relay, while Ψ 1 states that the source transmits data to the relay. In the second phase, the untrusted relay normalizes the received signal and transmits it with power of (1 − ξ) P . using the following amplification factor
the transmitted signal by the relay is x r = G r y r . While the relay broadcasts signal, the source transmits artificial noise to deceive Willie. The received th signal at the destination after applying self-interference cancellation is obtained
To simplify the mathematical formulation, we define two parameters γ sr and γ rd as γ sr = . Hence, the received SINR at the relay and the destination can be written as follows
where (a) follows from substituting (1) . Under high SNR assumption, (2) is simplified as
It is important to notice that deleting " + 1" from the denominator of γ R is equivalent to ignore the AWGN noise at the untrusted relay, which is equivalent to the highest eavesdropping attack at the relay. Hence, (3) can be rewritten
III. POWER ALLOCATION STRATEGY
In this part, our goal is to maximize the secrecy rate by considering the covert requirement at Willie.
A. Physical Layer Security
The instantaneous secrecy is defined as
, where log (1 + γ D ) and log (1 + γ R ) are the achievable information rates at the destination and the untrusted relay, respectively, where [v] + = max (v, 0). As mentioned before, the source transmits its data during some time slots to hide transmission from Willie. Therefore, by defining pr t as the probability of signal transmission by the source, the secrecy rate can be rewritten
Note that for ρ = 0, the secrecy rate is zero. As such, for optimal power allocation, we have, R sec ≥ 0 and consequently, the secrecy rate can be rewritten as R sec = prt 2
B. Covert Requirement
Based on the received signal power at Willie, Willie decides whether the data is transmitted or not. The received th signal at Willie in the first phase is given by
where n (1) w ∼ CN 0, σ 2 w is the AWGN noise at Willie. Note that in the covert communication literature, it is assumed that the codebook for data signal (x (1) s ) is unknown at Willie. Furthermore, the received th signal at Willie in the second phase is given by
where n (2) w ∼ CN 0, σ 2 w is the AWGN noise at Willie in second phase. In the covert communication, Willie selects a threshold and based on a comparison between the total received power and the selected threshold, decides whether source transmits data or not. In other words, Willie decides in the first and second phases based on (2) , respectively, which is demonstrated in [13] . This rule is the optimal decision rule from the perspective of Willie,
y w 2 is defined as the total power received by Willie during a time slot. When the source transmits data but Willie decides Ψ 0 , a miss detection with probability of P M D happens, while if source does not transmit data but Willie decides Ψ 1 , a false alarm with probability of P F A happens. The communication is covert when the following constraint is satisfied [13] :
The false alarm and miss detection probabilities in the first phase are respectively, given by
where χ 2 2n presents a chi-squared random variable, with 2n degrees of freedom. Furthermore by using (4), γ (1) is expressed
Similarly, the false alarm and miss detection probabilities in second phase are respectively, defined as
By employing (5), γ (2) can be written as γ (2) 
According to the strong law of large numbers (SLLN),
n converges to 1, and based on lebesgues dominated convergence theorem [16] χ 2 2n n can be replaced with 1, when n → ∞. Hence, the false alarm and the miss detection probabilities in the first phase can be rewritten as follows
also in the second phase, we haves:
For solving (11)- (14) , the probability density function (PDF) of γ (1) and γ (2) are required, hence, one term in γ (1) is approximated. By exploiting the law of large numbers for large N s [9] , [17] , the approximation , is helpful. Moreover, by the Lindeberg-Levy central limit theorem, the distribution of the random variable h H sr h sw can be approximated as CN (0, N s µ sr µ sw ). Hence, Λ is as an exponential random variable with mean µ sw . Finally, PDFs for γ (1) and γ (2) are as follows respectively,
By employing (15) , (16) and substituting them into (11)- (14) , and after some mathematical manipulation we have
According to (17)-(20) , Willie attempts to select its decision threshold greater than the variance of noise in both phases. In other words it selects ϑ (1) > σ 2 w and ϑ (2) > σ 2 w .
C. Power Allocation Optimization Problem
In this section, our optimization problem, with the goal of maximizing the achievable secrecy rate by considering the covert requirement at Willie is formulated. Hence, the optimization problem can be written as max ρ,ξ
The constraints (21b) and (21c) specify the range of power allocation factors in the first and second phases, respectively. (21d) and (21e) present the worst-case covert rate requirement at Wilie in first and second phases, respectively. In order to solve (21), first, it is necessary to solve (21d) and (21e) to obtain optimal ϑ (1) and ϑ (2) from Wilie perspective. 1) Optimal Threshold for Willie: For obtaining the optimal ϑ (1) and ϑ (2) , it is necessary to derivative from P M D with respect to ϑ (1) and ϑ (2) , respectively. After the calculation of = 0 and some mathematical manipulations, we have
where λ 
Finally, by employing (24) and (25), the utilization of the axillary variables t 0 and t 1 , the high SINR assumption, and some mathematical manipulations, the optimization problem (21) is equivalent to the following problem max ρ,ξ,t0,t1
This optimization problem is non-convex yet, because the objective function is non-concave. To tackle this problem, the Successive Convex approximation (SCA) method is employed to approximate the objective function to a concave one. This can be re-expressed as follows
Since (27) is the difference between two concave functions, the Difference of two Concave functions (DC) method can be employed to convert it to the concave function. Hence, (27) can be written as Ξ (ρ, ξ) = Σ (ρ, ξ) − Ω (ρ, ξ), where Σ (ρ, ξ) = log (ρς r γ rd (1 − ξ)) + log (1 − ρ) and Ω (ρ, ξ) = log (ρς r + 2 − ρ − ξ) + log (1 − ρ + ρς r ). By employing DC method, Ω (ρ, ξ) can be rewritten as follows
where µ is iteration number and ∇Ω (ρ, ξ) is gradient of Ω (ρ, ξ) which is calculated as∇Ω (ρ, ξ) = employed. This algorithm is ended when the stopping conditions i.e., |ρ (µ + 1) − ρ (µ)| ≤ θ and |ξ (µ + 1) − ξ (µ)| ≤ θ are satisfied, where θ is the stopping threshold.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this part, numerical examples are shown to evaluate the performance of joint covert communication and PLS in the considered one-way untrusted relaying network. The used parameters in our simulations are: σ 2 w = σ 2 = −50 dBW, the path loss exponent α = 4, the probability of transmission in each time slot pr t = 0.5, the channels are assumed complex Gaussian random variables, and P = 10 dBW. We assume that the source, destination, untrusted relay, and Willie are located at (−5, 0), (5, 0), (0, 0), and (0, −5). Fig. 1 shows the ergodic secrecy rate versus total transmit power. As can be seen, the ergodic secrecy rate is an increasing function with respect to the transmit power. The reason is that in our considered scenario, the injected jamming signal only deteriorates the received information signal at the unauthorized nodes and has no impact on the received information signal at the destination because of the interference cancellation at the destination. Moreover, this figure shows the impact of untrusted relay's location on the achievable secrecy performance. As seen, when the relay is near to source the ergodic secrecy rate is lower than the case when the relay is far from the source. The reason is that when the relay is close to the source, information leakage increases.
In Fig. 2 , the ergodic secrecy rate versus the number of antennas at source is shown. This figure evaluates the effect of lower bound of detection error probability at Willie i.e., 1 − . As seen in this figure, guaranty of 99.9% error in detection of Willie with respect to guaranty of 99% error, decreases the ergodic secrecy rate %14.35. The reason is that by increasing lower bound of detection error probability, in the first phase, the source has to decrease the power of information signal and destination has to increase the power of jamming signal. Furthermore, in the second phase the relay has to decrease the power of information signal and the source has to increase the power of jamming signal, which leads to a decrease in the achievable ergodic secrecy rate.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the problem of secure transmission with covert requirement in untrusted relaying networks was stud- ied. Our considered system model consisted of one source, one destination, one untrusted relay, and one Willie. It was assumed that the source has multiple antennas, while the rest have a single antenna. In our considered communication network, the untrusted relay tried to extract the information signal, while the goal of Willie was to detect the presence of the information signal transmitted by the source, in the communication phase. To overcome these two attacks, it was assumed that the destination and the source inject jamming signals to the network in phase I and phase II, respectively. For this system model, a novel power allocation method was proposed to maximize the instantaneous secrecy rate subject to satisfying the covert requirements in both of the phases. Since the proposed optimization problem was non-convex, the SCA approach was adopted to convert it to a convex optimization problem.
